Evidence--Negligence--Violation of City Ordinance--Some Evidence of Negligence--Proximate Cause (Carlock v. Westchester Lighting Company, 268 N.Y. 345 (1935)) by St. John\u27s Law Review
St. John's Law Review 
Volume 10 
Number 2 Volume 10, April 1936, Number 2 Article 19 
May 2014 
Evidence--Negligence--Violation of City Ordinance--Some Evidence 
of Negligence--Proximate Cause (Carlock v. Westchester Lighting 
Company, 268 N.Y. 345 (1935)) 
St. John's Law Review 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
St. John's Law Review (1936) "Evidence--Negligence--Violation of City Ordinance--Some Evidence of 
Negligence--Proximate Cause (Carlock v. Westchester Lighting Company, 268 N.Y. 345 (1935))," St. John's 
Law Review: Vol. 10 : No. 2 , Article 19. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol10/iss2/19 
This Recent Development in New York Law is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's 
Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of 
St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
to discharge this debt in lawful currency.7 After dividends are de-
clared out of surplus, such dividend becomes the property of the
stockholders irrespective of the time of payment.8 If the directors
provide in their resolution that the dividend shall be payable to the
holders of record on a certain day they may do so to protect the
corporation in paying to holders of record when they have no notice
of transfer.9 By this provision title is not affected.10
If the preferred stock is part of the capital assets of an estate,
it must follow that the common stock received in exchange in addi-
tion to the dividend declared thereon before decedent's death must
be substituted for the preferred shares, i. e., capital assets."
M. E. McC.
EVIDENCE-NEGLIGENCE-VIOLATION OF CITY ORDINANCE-
SOME EVIDENCE OF NEGLIGENCE-PROXIMATE CAuSE.-Plaintiff's
intestate, a member of the New York City Fire Department, in re-
sponding to an alarm, placed a ladder to the scaffolding on the un-
finished side of a burning building. As the plaintiff's intestate
stepped from the ladder to the platform of the scaffolding, his foot
came in contact with a live wire and he was electrocuted. At the
time the defendant company erected its high tension wires the lot
was vacant. The wires were so hung that when the building con-
struction began they crossed over the private property and were
within the building line. When the walls of the building approached
the wires, one of the building employees raised the wires about eight
feet above the scaffolding by means of a wooden strut. A rain storm
soaked the strut, short-circuited the wires and they fell to the scaf-
folding. At the trial, the judge excluded evidence of a city ordinance
requiring line wires to be at least eight feet from the nearest point
Cogswell v. Second Nat. Bank, 78 Conn. 75, 60 Atl. 1059 (1905), aff'd sub nor,
Jerome v. Cogswell, 204 U. S. 1, 27 Sup. Ct. 241 (1906) ; Green v. Bissell, 79
Conn. 547, 65 Atl. 1056 (1907).
'Williams v. Western U. Tel. Co., 93 N. Y. 162 (1883); Grants Pass
Hardware Co. v. Calvert, 71 Ore. 103, 142 Pac. 569 (1914).
'Brundage v. Brundage, 60 N. Y. 544 (1875) ; In re Kernochan, 104 N. Y.
618, 11 N. E. 149 (1887) ; Hoffer v. Sage, 112 N. Y. 530, 20 N. E. 350 (1889) ;
Robertson v. De Brulatdur, 188 N. Y. 30, 80 N. E. 938 (1907) ; Hill v.
Newichanwanich Co., 8 Hun 459, aff'd, 71 N. Y. 593 (1887); Rowe v. White,
112 App. Div. 688, aff'd, 189 N. Y. 523, 82 N. E. 1132 (1907); Warner v.
Watson & Gibson, 4 Misc. 12, 23 N. Y. Supp. 922 (Sup. Ct. 1893).
Brisbane v. D. L. & W. R. R., 25 Hun 438, 94 N. Y. 204 (1883).
"Jones v. Terra Haute etc. Ry., 57 N. Y. 196 (1874) ; Brisbane v. D. L.
& W. R. R., 25 Hun 438, 94 N. Y. 204 (1893); Robertson v. De Brulatour,
188 N. Y. 30, 80 N. E. 938 (1907).
" In. re Osborn, 209 N. Y. 450, 103 N. E. 723 (1913) ; Pratt v. Ladd, 253
N. Y .213, 170 N. E. 895 (1930).
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RECENT DECISIONS
of the building over which they pass. From a judgment in favor
of the defendant, plaintiff appeals. Held, judgment reversed. The
failure to obey the city ordinance I for the protection or benefit of
individuals is some evidence of negligence, and it was error to ex-
clude the ordinance from the jury. Carlock v. Westchester Lighting
Company, 268 N. Y. 345, 197 N. E. 306 (1935).
It is well settled in New York that where an ordinance for the
protection of individuals prohibits the doing of acts, or imposes a
duty, the neglect to obey the prohibition or perform the duty is some
evidence of negligence. 2 Although there was a break in the chain
of events between the violation of the ordinance and the death of
the plaintiff's intestate, namely the propping up of the wires and
the rain storm, the jury might have found the violation of the stat-
ute to be the proximate cause of the death, for several acts may
occur to produce one result, one or more of which is the proximate
cause.3 The intervening causes do not breach the chain of causation
to such an extent as to relieve the defendant from liability and it
was within the province of the jury to determine whether the act of
the defendant gave rise to the stream of events which culminated
in the accident. 4 An electric light company is reasonably chargeable
with knowledge or in the exercise of reasonable prudence, is bound
to anticipate that people lawfully come into proximity to its wires
and it is under an obligation to keep them in a safe condition.5
In the trial of the instant case in the Appellate Division the
court in affirming a judgment in favor of the defendant pointed out
that at the time of the erection of the wires the lot over which they
passed was vacant; that it had remained vacant for some years; that
the defendant had had no notice of construction and that under
these circumstances the ordinance had no application." Constructive
notice was a question of fact for the jury for the defendant offered
no evidence to show that it had no knowledge that construction was
1 Code of Ordinances of the City of New York, c. 9, art. 3, § 301, subd. b,
requires, "Line wires shall be at least eight feet from the nearest point of the
building over which they pass, and if attached to roof structures shall be sub-
stantially constructed. Wherever feasible, wires crossing over buildings shall
be supported on structures which are independent of buildings."
2 Massoth v. Delaware and Hudson Canal Co., 64 N. Y. 524 (1876) ; Willy
v. Mulledy, 78 N. Y. 346 (1879); Racine v. Morris, 201 N. Y. 240, 94 N. E.
864 (1911) ; Schumer v. Caplin, 241 N. Y. 346, 150 N. E. 139 (1925) ; Newhall
v. McCann, 267 N. Y. 394, 196 N. E. 302 (1935).
'Ring v. City of Cohoes, 77 N. Y. 83 (1879) ; Ivory v. Town of Deerpark,
116 N. Y. 476, 22 N. E. 1080 (1889) ; O'Neill v. City of Port Jervis, 253 N. Y.
423, 171 N. E. 694 (1930).
'Donnelly v. Pierce Contracting Co., 222 N. Y. 210, 118 N. E. 605 (1918);
Williams v. Koehler and Co., 41 App. Div. 426, 58 N. Y. Supp. 863 (2d Dept.
1899); Brand v. Borden's Condensed Milk Co., 89 App. Div. 188 (2d Dept.
1903).
'Braun v. Buffalo General Electric Co., 200 N. Y. 484. 94 N. E. 206(1911).
'Carlock v. Westchester Lighting Co., 242 App. Div. 778, 274 N. Y. Supp.
580 (2d Dept. 1934).
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going on. If constructive notice is sufficient it places on electric
light companies an unreasonable burden which requires a constant
lookout over all vacant property or building operations which is too
strict a rule to apply.7 But apparently the burden has been placed




MARKETS LAW.-A servant living with his master was injured by
swallowing broken pieces of glass about the size of beans, apparently
contained in an unchipped bottle of cream delivered to the master's
house. There was evidence to show that glass was in the bottle after
some of the cream had been used and that the cereal did not contain
any broken glass. The dairy introduced evidence respecting the
customary safety tests surrounding the bottling of the cream.
The court charged the jury that there was an implied warranty
that the cream contained no deleterious substance harmful to the
person who used it. Upon appeal, after verdict for plaintiff, the
Appellate Division recognizing that such an implied warranty applies
only to the benefit of the purchaser,1 affirmed the verdict because it
felt that the error did not affect the result since there was negligence
present as a matter of law, being inferred on the theory that Section
50 of the Agriculture and Markets Law applies to the facts here.
Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals, held, that the Agriculture
Carlock v. Westchester Lighting Co., 268 N. Y. 345, dissenting opinion of
Crane, C. J.
'Giminez v. The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 264 N. Y. 390, 191
N. E. 27 (1934).
There are many jurisdictions which hold that an implied warranty follows
through the dealer to the purchaser or ultimate consumer, Dothan Chero-Cola
Bottling Co. v. Weeks, 16 Ala. App. 639, 80 So. 734 (1918); Watson v.
Augusta Brewing Co., 124 Ga. 121, 52 S. E. 152 (1905) ; Parks v. C. C. Yost
Pie Co., 93 Kan. 334, 144 Pac. 202 (1914); Ward v. Morehead City Sea Food
Co., 171 N. C. 33, 87 S. E. 958 (1916); Catani v. Swift Co., 251 Pa. 52,
95 Atl. 931 (1915); Madden v. The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 106
Pa. Super. Ct. 474, 162 Atl. 687 (1932) ; Mazeth v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash.
662, 135 Pac. 633 (1913).
Cases holding no warranty except to original purchaser: Birmingham
Chero-Cola Bottling Co. v. Clark, 205 Ala. 678, 89 So. 64 (1921); Flacconio
v. Eysink, 129 Md. 367, 100 Atl. 510 (1917) ; Pelletier v. Dupont, 124 Me. 269,
128 Atl. 186 (1925); McCaffrey v. Mossherg and Branville Mfg. Co., 23 R. I.
381, 50 AtI. 651 (1901) ; Crigger v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 132 Tenn. 545,
179 S. W. 155 (1915).
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